Recently it has been shown, that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment schemes are in general impossible. I however argue if we allow that an honest Alice can fail with some small probability then secure protocols might exist. A scheme using quantum envelopes is proposed where the Mayers-Chau-Lo strategy fails. †
Introduction
Quantum computers opened a new era in theoretical cryptography. If a working quantum computer ever be built it will make obsolete most of the existing open cryptographic methods because these mostly rely on the assumption that factoring large numbers and computing the discrete logarithm are computationally extremely difficult tasks. Both can be done in polynomial time with the help of a quantum computer [1] . (For an overview on quantum computations see [2] .)
But the laws of quantum mechanics offer novel ways for cryptography [3] . There are two main lines of research: quantum key distribution and quantum bit commitment and related topics. On the one hand, quantum key distribution [4] is proven to be unconditionally secure against attacks by a third party. On the other hand, there is a serious doubt about the existence of a secure quantum bit commitment protocol. Bit commitment would be an important building block of more complicated cryptographic protocols and several methods have been proposed, one of them the BCJL protocol [5] was believed to be secure for a long time.
Surprisingly Mayers [6] and independently Chau and Lo [7] [8] showed that this is not correct. They proved the insecurity of a large class of protocols against an EPR-type attack and it was later extended by Lo [9] to other two party protocols.
Although the class of protocols these authors examined is wide, it is not completely exhaustive. Mayers, Chau and Lo showed that a bit commitment scheme where both Alice and Bob may only cheat with negligible small probability and an honest Alice may always succeed in proving her decision, is impossible. We cannot loosen the first two requirements, so if we want a secure protocol we must drop the third one.
Quantum Envelopes
The original question on this topic was the following: Can we put two or more classical bits into one qbit, using its continuous degree of freedom? Of course we can only extract one bit at the end, but we might decide later which one to obtain. This could be useful for example at cable television broadcasting, where the broadcaster sends much more information than what is actually used. (The receiver watches only one TV channel.)
It can easily be seen if we want 100% reliability then such a method is impossible because we need more than two orthogonal states. But if we allow some error we may use the following QTV 2 coding scheme,
We can extract the first bit by measuring in the bases |0 , |1 , and the second in |0 − |1 , |0 + |1 . The probability of success is p = cos 2 (π/8) ≈ 0.85. Unfortunately the channel capacity [2] ,
turns out to be C ≈ 0.4 < 0.5 so the method is incapable for such a data compression, but it can be useful at other areas.
(QTV is also available for 3 bits (QTV 3 ). In this case we use the 8 vertices of a cube embedded into the Riemann sphere, the bases for extracting the desired bit are |0 , |1 or |0 ± |1 or |0 ± i |1 . The probability of success is 1/2(1 + 1/3) ≈ 0.79, the channel capacity C ≈ 0.256.)
Imagine, Alice just bought a new car and she wants to install some effective steal protection system. Nowadays one of the most effective method is to continuously send the position of the car to a center. If it is stolen, the center knows where to look for the car. But there is one disadvantage of this system, the center can monitor where Alice goes. If we have quantum computers then we can easily solve this problem.
In this situation Alice wants to send (or we may say deposit) some information to Bob who should read this information only under certain circumstances (i.e. if the car was stolen). To achieve this, Alice encodes the information using some error correcting method that can correct up to 15% error rate, then chooses a random string of bits, encodes the message and the random string using the QTV 2 scheme and sends these qbits to Bob. Bob stores it in a quantum memory and if necessary, he extracts the message and corrects the errors. When Alice wants to check that Bob did not read her message she asks him to send it back, and then as she knows exactly the state of the qbits she measures it using the appropriate bases. (c |0 − s |1 , s |0 + c |1 or c |0 + s |1 , −s |0 + c |1 ). If Bob read the message he cannot reconstruct the quantum state, and Alice will find a 25% error rate in her measurements. This is of course not a bit commitment protocol, Bob can read the message at any time without any additional information from Alice. But upon request he must send the original qbits back. It is like a quantum key-distribution scheme, where Alice sends the qbits to herself through a channel where Bob may try to gain some information without being detected. Quantum key-distribution is believed to be a secure algorithm and in this case Bob's task is even more difficult because there are no classical messages between the two parties because they are the same.
The classical analogue of bit commitment is that Alice puts her message into a safe. In this case Alice would put the message into an envelope which can be opened, but cannot be closed again. This is why I call this method quantum envelope 1 . Clearly, information envelopping is impossible in the classical world. If Alice has sent some classical information to Bob, there is no way to assure Alice: Bob forgot this information.
Finally I would like to mention an interesting fact about the information content of the QTV 2 coding scheme. If Alice encodes two random bits (i.e. all four possibilities have equal probability), then the von Neumann entropy [2] of the qbit:
indicating that it contains 1 bit of information on the two random bits. But we saw that Bob can extract only 0.4 bit, then where is the other 0.6 bit hiding? It is there, but Bob needs some help to obtain it. If Alice tells him the exclusive or of her two bits (which is clearly only one bit of information) then Bob knows that the qbit can only be in one of two orthogonal states, and he can easily learn the second bit. So the exclusive or is only one bit but is worth 1.6 bit for Bob.
The bit commitment scheme proposal
The protocol is the following:
1. Alice chooses 2n random bits a i , b i (i = 1, .., n), encodes them by the QTV 2 scheme and sends the resulting n qbits to Bob. 2. For every i Bob randomly measures either a i or b i . (Of course about 15% of his measurements are wrong.) 3. Bob puts his decisions on which bit to measure and the result of the measurements into a quantum envelope but he does not use any error correcting method, and sends this 2n qbits to Alice. 4. Alice chooses one half of the pairs of qbits, and tells her choice to Bob. 5. Bob tells Alice which one of a i and b i he measured in these cases, what were the results and what are the random bits he used to close the envelope. 6. Alice opens the selected half of the envelope. Her measurements must be in perfect agreement with the data given by Bob and the deviation of Bob's measurements from the real a i , b i must be within the confidence limits and about half of them must be a measurement of a i . If this is not so then Bob probably wants to cheat and Alice must abort the operation. If everything looks all right then Alice stores the other half of the quantum envelope in a quantum memory. She must keep them until the reveal step. The bits revealed by Bob are thrown away. 7. Alice sends Bob an error correction checksum on the a i -s, that can correct d errors 2 . The value of d will be specified later.
At the end of the initialization Alice has n/2 pairs of random bits a i , b i and n/2 pairs of qbits, the remaining of the quantum envelope. Bob has n/2 bits which are the estimates of a i or b i and the checksum. 8. After this initialization, Alice must choose the bit to be committed, e = 0 or 1. 9. Alice sends Bob a i XOR b i using the BB84 [10] coding scheme, i.e. she uses the bases |0 , |1 if e = 0 and the bases |0 + |1 , |0 − |1 if e = 1. Bob stores this n/2 qbit.
This concludes the commit part.
2 In the following it is assumed that this checksum cannot correct nor detect more than d errors. Usually error correction codes are constructed by putting spheres of radius d with respect to the Hamming distance into the vector field of binary strings of length n. Generally it cannot be done tightly (an exception is n = 7, d = 1) thus there will be strings that do not belong to any sphere. If Bob receives such a string then he knows that there were more than d errors. But if n and d are suitably chosen then it can be achieved that the probability of detecting more than d ′ errors is negligible small and d ′ is not much greater then d. Why does it work? First let us show that the proof of Mayers, Chau and Lo is not applicable here. If Bob is honest then Alice was given with one particle states after step 3. One half of them refers to those bits which are just about to be thrown away, so this part is unimportant. She cannot fiddle with the other part either, because Bob knows the state of these and any entanglement will be detected. Thus, when considering Alice's cheating opportunities we need not consider this part. Alice only sends 2(n/2) qbits and a checksum to Bob. Following the Mayers-Chau-Lo strategy Alice instead of choosing random bits, selects entangled pairs of qbits and computes the checksum and the qbits to be sent to Bob with a quantum computer. If she changes her mind, she performs a unitary transformation on the qbits that are left on her side that changes her bit. This can be done if during the commit part she provides Bob with the same density matrix independent of e. But here this is not the case. If Bob could delay his measurements until the end of the commit phase then he could easily find out e. He just assumes that Alice has e = 0 in mind, he measures the BB84 encoded qbits and he gets a i XOR b i . After a i XOR b i are known, the QTV 2 encoded bits can be only in two orthogonal states and it can be measured using the appropriate bases (which is rotated by ±π/8 with respect to the honest bases). If the checksum does not agree with a i then Alice's bit is 1, if it agrees than it is 0 with very high probability. Now it is clear why do we need the complicated initialization. Alice must be sure that Bob already measured the first n qbits before she sends the second portion. 
The original state was
where x and y are unknown to Bob. After the transformation he sends the ancilla to Alice and another qbit where he claims that he measured a i . (To get the precise QTV 2 coding, both qbits must be rotated by π/8 but this only complicates our discussion.) If Alice wants him to reveal this bit he simply measures the qbit in the a i basis and announces the result. (The scrambling bit is the complementer of the result.) It can be seen, that Alice cannot notice this cheat. If this bit is not selected, Bob may try to measure it in the basis, determined by the BB84 qbit. But because of the entanglement, a measurement only on the qbit at Bob cannot give the correct answer. Simple computation shows that Bob can only determine a i with an error probability of c 2 so he gained nothing. To eliminate this error, he would need the other qbit to perform the inverse transformation, but this qbit is deposited at Alice, and Bob will not get it back before the reveal step.
A more general attack is when Bob takes 3 ancilla bits, the firs two in a singlet state, the third in |0 and performes either the unitary transformation (3) or 1 2
on the QTV 2 qbit and the third ancilla. It is controlled by the 2 nd ancilla which transformation to use. After this Bob sends the second and third ancilla to Alice, the second contains information on Bob's choice, the third on the result of his measurement, at least Alice thinks so. Again, if Alice wants to open this envelope, Bob measures his two qbits and this determines the state of Alice's qbit. The above transformations guarantee the 85% agreement with the (a i , b i )-s. But, if this bit is not selected, then Bob is left with a density matrix. For example if a i = b i = 0 then it is:
Its eigenvalues are Can Alice cheat? Using the Mayers-Chau-Lo strategy not. Another possibility is that she sends entangled pairs of qbits to Bob. When she has decided on e she follows the same tactic as Bob would do without the envelope: she measures her half of the BB84 qbit pairs in the basis determined by e. Now she knows what Bob will measure. After this she measures the QTV 2 qbits using the dishonest basis determined by the previous measurement. The set of a i , b i she got differs from Bob's one by about 15%. But what about the checksum? In this strategy Alice cannot generate it from the qbits so she had had to tell Bob a random checksum. The a i -s she has are of course do not agree with this checksum so she has to change some bits, but this increases the distance between her and Bob's a i , b i . The expectation value of the number of bits to be changed can be roughly estimated from below by d/2 so at the end the average number of wrong bits is more than (1 − p)n/2 + (2p − 1)d/2 (p = c 2 ≈ 0.85). For n/2 is sufficiently large the width of the probability distributions can be small enough to allow Bob detecting this cheat.
It is not clear whether there are other possibilities. Here I would like just to outline why this scheme is not ruled out by the MCL proof. In the "General form of the BitCommitment Scheme" outlined in ref. [7] Bob must have the same density matrix after the commit part, otherwise he could cheat. Here this is not the case so we have to force Bob to measure in the initialization part. But this gives rise to uncertainties so even an honest Alice can fail to prove her committed bit. Particularly this scheme contradicts to Question/Answer 2 on page 7 of ref. [7] . Here Bob may not delay his measurement of step 2. If he sends some entangled qbits instead of the quantum envelope then the method becomes a "General Bit-Commitment Scheme" and he allows Alice to involve these qbits in the unitary transformation of changing her mind 3 . The key element of the protocol are these qbits and the method which prevents both party from touching them.
Conclusion
I showed above a bit commitment protocol which evades the MCL proof of the impossibility of unconditionally secure QBC. Their proof is not wrong but this protocol does not fit in their definition of the general QBC. Although I showed the security against two obvious cheating strategy the protocol's security is not proven so the question of the existence of a secure QBC is reopened but not solved. This method is a bit complicated and requires quantum memory even for the honest participants so it is not realizable with the present technology. However a secure QBC would be a very useful cryptographic primitive thus it is worth examining every possibility.
Although our methods are different both of them concentrate on the same loopholes in the proof of Mayers Chau and Lo.
In Kent's protocol the N A qbits sent back by Bob play a similar role as a quantum envelope. However in my protocol Alice's security is protected by the envelope which she keeps until the reveal step, in Kent's method the envelope is immediately sent back and Bob's honesty is ensured by his declarations of the n-s. This difference must be examined in the future.
Appendix: Probability distributions
In the text I usually used only the expectation values but in reality we must work with probability distributions. The number of errors in Bob's sequence of a i -s is given by the binomial distribution:
what determines the upper bound for d. Now examine Alice's cheating strategy. If she has a random checksum the probability that she must change m bits among the a i -s is given by
where the normalization factor is:
n/2 i .
For large n it becomes a very sharp distribution and one can use the estimate d instead of d/2 as was in the text. To determine the error distribution in the case of a cheating Alice we must convolute (7) and (8) , keeping in mind that some initial errors may be repaired when Alice changes the a i -s to agree with the checksum. The result is P a+d (z) = N 
and the sum is restricted to the values, where m + k − z is even.
